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TERROR AND THE HYDRA: 
REPRESSION AND RESURGENCE 
IN THE ARGENTINE WORKING CLASS 
James F. Petras 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1971 in the offices of the Argentine Industrialists Union (UIA), the 
organization of the largest industrial firms, I interviewed the head of the 
organization. We were discussing the political options most attractive to 
Argentine capitalists. When I asked what he thought of the Brazilian model, 
he looked ecstatic: "It's an industrialist's paradise." I then asked, "Why not in 
Argentina?" His brow furried and he replied in a measured tone: "The 
Argentine trade unions are too strong, they would resist, there might be a civil 
war and we don't know who would win, how it would come out." Faced with 
this uncertainty, he thought, in the circumstances, that it would be best for the 
military to return power to the civilian politicians, to defuse the polarization 
and tension racking Argentina at the time, and which the military was not in a 
position to control. What struck me at the time, but became more apparent in 
retrospect, was the fact that the business leaders' hesitation in accepting a 
terrorist regime and bloody repression was all contingent on the issue of the 
probability of success. There was not a moment's consideration of lives lost or 
democratic values, rather there was a fear that if the battle was engaged and 
lost, there would be an even greater degree of working class power. The 
implication was clear; if a Brazilian solution could be imposed through a 
successful civil war against the working class then by all means the big 
business community was all for it. Unquestionably what was a central concern 
to the most prominent and leading industrialists was the industrial paradise of 
Brazil of the late 1960's: no strikes, labor unions controlled by a police state, 
social security, and wage cuts imposed by the capitalist class, dismantling of 
the state sector, freeing of prices, etc. — the phrase "industrial paradise" 
signified the capacity of the industrialists to do whatever they wished without 
hindrance from workers' organizations and a 
nationalist-populist state. But as the industrialists knew too well there were 
formidable obstacles to realizing their Molochian-erotic fantasies: the in-
surrectionary movements in Cordoba and Rosario, the incendiary uprising in 
Tucumán, the total shut-down of the economy resulting from the general 
strikes decreed by the C.G.T. Only a regime willing to take the most extreme 
measures in the most determined fashion was capable of paving the road to 
that "paradise." The industrialists were willing to support such a regime if and 
when it would emerge. . . The regime of March 1976 was up to its "historic 
task" set forth by the capitalist class — it proceeded to the most radical 
transformation of society in modern Argentine history as a means of realizing 
the industrialist's paradise. My discussion will focus on the uniqueness of this 
terrorist regime and its impact on Argentine society. The scope and depth of 
terror practiced by this government is inadequately described by terms such as 
"bureaucratic-authoritarian." Rather the scope and depth of repression suggest 
something akin to fascist terrorist regimes. My purpose, however, is to 
examine the impact of this terror and repression on the Argentine left and to 
examine the differential impact which it has had on formal and informal 
organization. My thesis is that while the repression has been successful in 
decimating the formal organizational apparatus of the 'left,' it has failed to 
destroy the informal popular movement. The other unique aspect of the 
Argentine situation is the massive resurgence of working class struggle — 
despite the fascist terror — on a scale and scope unheard of in any other 
country having a similar type of regime. Moreover, this working class re-
surgence occurs despite the inactivity of formal democratic political insti-
tutions, the illegalization of the Trade Unions, the murder, jailing and exile of 
practically all the known official leaders, especially those known at the 
national or regional level. Finally, the resurgence occurs despite the massive 
and continuing purges of grassroots leaders. The issue that I am centrally 
concerned with then is where does this "undirected" rank and file resurgence 
come from and what sustains it in the absence of official organization and in 
the face of an all pervasive terroristic police apparatus. 
TERROR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARGENTINA 
Though Argentina has been ruled off and on by military dictators since 
the 1930's, the military regime of March 1976 represents an entirely new form 
of domination, both in terms of the scale, scope and duration of repression. 
Never has the Argentine working class been subject to the level of terror and 
sustained attack as it has experienced during the Videla regime. The singular 
effort by the military, para-military and police forces to abolish all forms of 
political opposition has produced an unprecedented level of political 
assassinations, jailings and exiles: over 30,000 deaths and disappearances, 
thousands of jailings, hundreds of thousands of exiles, tens of thousands of 
tortured, mutilated and disfigured. Practically everyone in Argentina has 
direct personal ties with at least someone affected by the repression. More-
over, millions of Argentine workers and salaried employees have seen their 
political parties, trade unions, community and social service organizations 
intervened and/or closed down — thus eliminating all the organizations which 
were created over the past 50 years. The regime of 1976 has set in motion 
forces and policies which are uprooting institutions and relationships estab-
lished through the greater part of the 20th century. In that precise historic 
context we cannot consider this a "conservative" or "traditional" dictatorship. 
Previous dictatorships from the 1930's through the early 1970's 
(Aram-buro, Ongania, Lanusse, etc.) were either "caretaker" regimes — 
seizing power to displace a populist government and prepare conditions for 
the return of a civilian regime — or engaged in haphazard, limited assaults, 
selective assassinations and official imprisonment. In contrast, the neo-fascist 
regime engages in massive assassination, "disappearances" of political 
prisoners by para-military death-squads in a systematic and sustained fashion. 
The institutionalization of terror and the permanent purge mark a qualitatively 
different form of dictatorship. The needs of large-scale capital for long-term 
security and sweeping access to all sectors of the economy confronted the 
obstacle of a highly organized working class; the end result was the 
long-term, all pervasive police-state. 
The central object of the state was the transformation of the major ob-
stacle to capital expansion: the organized class conscious working class. The 
major goal of the terror was to transform the working class from an obstacle 
to capital accumulation to an instrument. The purpose of the terror was a 
sustained effort to systematically abolish the memory of solidarity, the social 
bonds within the working class, to atomize the class and inculcate the feelings 
of subordination, inferiority and servility characteristic of the pre-Peronist 
period: the ideal is to reproduce the docile cabecitas negras found in the past 
on the rural estates within the urban working class. 
Much of the world's media has focused on the plight of the refugees, the 
regime's persecution of the intellectuals and professionals — the killing and 
torture of well-known personalities, guerrilla leaders, etc. But as Juan Carlos 
Marion has demonstrated, the great bulk of those murdered by the regime 
were rank and file workers.1 The regime has launched wholesale attacks on 
militants in the factories — whole executive councils of locals have "dis-
appeared" — and local officials: grassroots leaders, shop stewards, class 
oriented unionists and rank and file oriented Peronists have all been subject to 
one form or another of repression. Every major enterprise which has had 
"labor conflict" has been affected; in each case the regime intervenes on 
the side of the owners, giving capital absolute control over its labor force. 
Never has the capitalist state acted in such an unconditional, unmediated 
fashion on behalf of capital. 
Thus while the Videla regime represents a unique "break" with Argentina 
history, the reemergence of working class struggle on a massive scale in the 
face of terror represents a unique break-through for the working class 
movement in Latin America. Despite the continuing terror, thousands of 
strikes have taken place between November 1978 and January 1980, involving 
tens of thousands of workers. The Argentine working class has not been im-
mobilized in the same fashion as has occurred in Chile and Uruguay. The 
explanations for this immobilization, which rely on repression, fail to explain 
why in Argentina, with similar or greater levels of repression, the struggle has 
broken out throughout the country and in a variety of industries and regions. 
Moreover, the level of formal organizations of the working class was higher in 
Argentina and the subsequent dismantlement of these organizations was 
greater — thus leaving few formal institutional forms of expression open. 
Finally, through the connivance of the great powers (U.S.A., Russia, China, 
etc.), the violations of human rights in Argentina have received far less 
attention than, say, Chile, and the struggle has certainly received far less 
outside support. The same can be said for the role of the Church, which has 
been critical of the regime in Chile but notably acquiescent in Argentina. The 
question that is posed is this: given the massive dismemberment of the formal 
organization of the working class movement, the lack of international and 
internal institutional support, what accounts for the resurgence of working 
class mass action?2 
THE TWO FACES OF THE ARGENTINE LEFT 
I would like to call attention to a fundamental division within the Argen-
tine left that cuts across formal political, trade union and social organizations 
and ideology that is essential to understanding the process of class struggle 
emerging in the post-1976 period. There are essentially two Argentine 'lefts,' 
or popular movements, each with their own distinct political style, social 
position and structure. We may refer to one as the "political class" and the 
other as the "rank and file." The political class is composed of the leaders and 
organizers within the formal organizations, the professional politicians and 
trade union bureaucrats, the university intellectuals and professionals, the 
spokespeople for the Marxist and nationalist traditions who, in large part 
provide the apparatus for the formal organizations and formulate the program 
for political action at the national level. The political class has been in charge 
of organizing the general strikes, the election campaigns, the public 
demonstrations, the guerrilla raids, the signing of collective agreements, the 
 
publication of journals, manifestos, etc. The political class has also received 
almost all the attention of the political and social analysts. When writing 
about the Argentine popular movement, most of the writing refers to the 
activities and policies of this group and the reactions of the rank and file to 
the activities organized by the formal organizations. 
These analyses seem to me to be shortsighted and to overlook the fact 
that the "rank and file" working class have their own social, political, familial 
networks around which they organize a good part of their life; that these 
relations, activities, values and social position are distinct from those of the 
political class even as they share with the "political class" common organi-
zational membership (though different positions in the organization), com-
mon electoral behavior and common opposition to the military, ruling class, 
etc. However, there is a common sub-culture that unites the working class 
independently of the formal organization which embraces kinship, neighbor-
hood, workplace and social clubs. The common experiences shared within 
these settings sets off the working class from the political class. The differ-
ences manifest themselves in some cases in different forms of verbal ex-
pression, but most fundamentally in the notion of compañerismo 
(comradship) that comes from sharing the day to day hardships, social events, 
tragedies, sporting events. Moreover, there is even a "racial component" as 
the rank and file tend to be a "cabecita negras," while the political class is 
largely drawn from the "European" background. 
In practice, in the pre-1976 period, the two levels, the political class and 
the rank and file, interacted in general strikes, demonstrations, elections, etc., 
but not on a day to day basis. There was a separation of class, life style and 
language. Thus there are two sets of class bonds that involve the working 
class: the vertical bonds manifested in their membership and activity in the 
impersonal national organization (Peronist movement, CGT, etc.), linking 
together the working class on a national level for political struggle; and the 
horizontal bonds found in the face to face relations in the neighborhood and 
workplace where the struggle is over immediate issues. This distinction 
within the Argentine popular movement between the "political class" and the 
"rank and file" is crucial to understanding how and why the Argentine 
working class struggle continues despite the savage repression of the formal 
organizations and the all pervasive activities of the secret police and the 
terroristic para-military forces. The capacity of the Argentine working class 
to sustain collective struggle for class demands is rooted in the distinctive 
features of the Argentine working class, features found in few other workers' 
movements in the world in the same degree. 
DISTINCT FEATURES OF THE ARGENTINE WORKING CLASS 
The most striking feature of the Argentine working class is the extraordi-
nary degree of class solidarity and organization. This is manifested in its 
unique capacity to successfully execute massive general strikes on a nation-
wide basis with maximum success. I know of no country in the world where 
repeated general strikes of 24, 48 and 72 hours were called and supported by 
the entire class voluntarily, that is, with no effort to "coerce" the different 
class member into participation. Moreover, numerous strikes were called in 
the middle of workdays — say at 10 a.m. — and in impressive displays of 
class solidarity hundreds of thousands of workers "down their tools" in the 
presence of employers and, at times, in the face of military mobilizations. In 
1971,1 witnessed a massive walk-out of workers from an auto-plant, part of a 
general strike, in which the workers had to walk through a cordon of heavily 
armed troops. Not one worker remained in the plant. The class solidarity 
extended to other strata also, involving small business people, teachers, social 
workers, etc. I recall in Córdoba having my shoes shined when the whistle 
went off signalling the beginning of a general strike and the bootblack stopped 
working, leaving one shoe unpolished. When the strike was called even the 
streetwalkers disappeared. 
The second feature of the Argentine working class was a general 
rejection of the state and ruling class domination and values. This is not to say 
that the workers did not demand services from the state, did not participate in 
national pastimes (soccer-matches), etc., but rather brought its own set of 
values and interests into play while engaging the adversary. Thus in extracting 
benefits from the state, the workers did not respond with "gratitude" but as 
something to which they were entitled and indeed must receive. The 
bourgeoisie was sick to death of this "prepotencia de clase" as it characterized 
the self-affirmation of the working class. Even when workers participated in 
'national events,' such as soccer matches, which supposedly bring all classes 
together — the seating arrangements and form of involvement reflects class 
differences. Moreover, the "national unity" is rather a surface phenomenon. 
During the Copa Hemispheric that I witnessed in 1971 in Buenos Aires, a 
disputed play penalizing the Argentine team led to massive chants of 
"Argentina" — till the police came onto the field and pointed their riot guns at 
the vocal, but peaceful, galleries made up overwhelmingly of workers. 
Immediately the chant changed to asesinos, while the bourgeois Argentines 
occupying reserved and box seats were silent. The presence of state 
authorities clearly evoked the underlying class hostilities of the working class, 
even in this mixed cultural setting. 
On a more general level, the notion of class interest is manifested in the 
intransigent insistence of the working class to not sacrifice their standard of 
living for an illusory "national development" — capitalist accumulation. The 
level of mystification in this sense is very low. Even Perón was completely 
incapable of imposing any sacrifice of working class interests in the name of 
national capitalist growth. On the contrary, Peron's influence was totally 
dependent on his capacity to secure benefits for the working class and failing 
that his influences began to ebb. From this vantage point, working class 
support for Peronist politics was less a product of mystification and more the 
expression of the search for instrumental goals. 
The fourth feature of the Argentine working class was powerful informal 
bonds, expressed through family, neighborhood and workplace that reinforced 
class bonds and links among the working class and against the ruling class. 
Family and kinship ties have frequently been described as "conservative" 
forces, limiting class consciousness, etc. This approach assumes what it needs 
to prove — that the family and kinship groups themselves contain and trans-
mit alien conservative values. In the Argentine case, at least two generations 
(1940-1950 and 1960-1970) shared common experiences of class struggle and 
organization. They shared membership in the same class anchored social 
clubs, trade unions, asados (cook-outs), and therefore the primary group 
orientation reinforced class ties. Likewise, working and living place associ-
ations have been described as inculcating 'parochial,' 'local' outlooks which 
are supposedly incompatible with class consciousness. Once again, the argu-
ment assumes that the content of the local involvement is diffuse or devoid of 
class content — which is precisely not the point: the neighborhoods and 
workplaces in Argentina are preeminently class homogeneous, at least to the 
degree of containing predominantly working and lower salaried employees 
and petty vendors. The heavy arms and large contingents of police forces that 
were mobilized to make arrests in working class neighborhoods attests to the 
fear that state authorities had of neighborhood reactions. Likewise, most kid-
nappings of workers took place after working hours to avoid the collective 
wrath at the place of employment. 
The fifth feature of the Argentine working class was the high levels of 
trust, confidence and mutual support within local working class communities. 
This factor is crucial in understanding why the secret police has been 
hardpressed to break locally organized strikes and protests. It is extremely 
difficult to crack the tight family, kinship and neighborhood ties. For a worker 
to become a police informer would not only label him a traitor to an "ab-
stract" class but an enemy to his most basic and personal relations. It would 
lead to total ostracism from life-long companions, friends and, most important 
family members. The primary ties provide a security for local class or-
ganizations and activists that no formal organization can match and to which 
no police or par-military organization has been able to destroy. Within these 
networks all the prohibited activities take place — and the word hardly ever 
leaks out. I recall viewing a prohibited Pro-Peronist film during the Lanusse 
period "Ni Vencidos ni Vencedores"in a Rosario working class house with 30 
or 40 other people — essentially 3 or 4 families, including grandparents, par-
ents and children without any sense of a security problem. Contrary to more 
conventional social scientists who speak of a "non-participatory," "alienated" 
or "non-integrated" working class I find a high degree of integration in 
working class sub-culture which coincides with a rejection or non-participa-
tion in the dominant or oppressor culture promoted by the ruling class. The 
working class participated in formal political and social organization of the 
class but also maintained its class autonomy exercised through its informal 
local organizational ties. 
STA TE REPRESSION: IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CLASS AND 
THE RANK AND FILE 
My central point is that state repression has had a differential effect on 
the "two faces" of the Argentine left. Essentially it was most successful in 
undermining the formally organized popular movement and least successful in 
destroying the rank and file basis of struggle — even though the brunt of the 
repression has been borne by the latter. 
The political class has suffered massive destruction. Among the hundreds 
of thousands of Argentines in the diaspora are many of the intellectual, 
political and trade union leaders of the popular movement. The exiles are the 
relatively more fortunate victims — as the terror has taken a massive toll of 
victims through innumerable kidnappings and "disappearances." For those 
few political intellectuals and party people who have remained in Argentina 
and are not incarcerated, fear has largely paralyzed their public life: the main 
pre-occupation is survival. 
Along with the physical decimation of the activist core, the terrorist 
regime has gone about systematically dismantling the trade union organi-
zations intervening the universities and proscribing political parties — 
destroying all forms of autonomous political and social organization. The end 
result is that what is left of the formal organization is largely an empty and 
impotent husk, tightly controlled or totally destroyed by the regime. The 
traditional political leaders hover together, petitioning and protesting but 
incapable of defining any new political initiatives or mobilizing any sig-
nificant popular support. For all intents and purposes the political class has 
been incapacitated. 
REPRESSION AND THE RANK AND FILE 
The regime did not confine itself to merely intervening at the apex of the 
hierarchical order of the political movement but aimed its principal blows at 
the middle and lower ranks among the militants of the popular movement: 
more than any other regime in Argentine history it acted to uproot the mass 
movement by a frontal assault on the main forces linked to the great mass of 
the wage labor force: the factory militants, the shop stewards, the local union 
leaders. The Videla dictatorship (unlike previous traditional leaders) did not 
believe that a "handful of foreign inspired agitators" were stirring up the 
otherwise complacent working class — nor did they act on that assumption. 
The dictatorship knew and acted on the assumption that the whole organized 
conscious working class was "responsible," for the strikes, wage demands and 
constraints on capital and therefore it extended a policy that would directly 
affect the class as a whole: mass terror without constraints against all working 
class militants, with or without Marxist, Peronist or syndicalist affiliations. 
For a brief conjuncture this massive bloody purge did arrest and perhaps 
intimidate the working class (April 7, 1976 till October 1978). Many of the 
known local militants and political cadres were wiped out. The disarticulation 
of the national networks and formal political structures did temporarily 
disorient the working class. The result however was not permanent 
atomiza-tion or massive paralysis as the regime had hoped, but a turning 
inward — the working class turned to the most elementary and secure forms 
or organization and struggle: to local activity organized around particular 
industries, factories or neighborhoods; to limited demands for immediate 
needs (wage increases). From within each locale new anonymous leaders 
emerged, collective spokespersons who negotiated contracts over the phone 
— the rank and file developed created forms of action to secure demands and 
avoid assassination. Local organizations were reconstituted based on primary 
and secondary groups — loyalties of kinship and friendship reinforced class 
ties and ensured security against the terrorist state. By September 1979 a 
whole wave of strikes had broken out throughout the metalurgical, transport 
and other industries. Hundreds of strikes in large and small plants became 
everyday occurence. This massive upsurge occurred despite the continuing 
terror and in the absence of the formal trade union party and intellectual 
leadership. This resurgence of rank and file action can only be explained by 
the durability of the underlying class bonds located in the family, 
neighborhood and factory, reinforced by the popular culture and provoked by 
the severe decline in standard of living. Explanations that resort to 
"spontaneity" refuse to look behind the existence of formal organization. The 
autonomous working class rank and file of Argentine industrial capitalism 
activate themselves and sustain activity through long standing association in 
informal settings and 
groupings. This informal Argentine left is today the most vital force in 
society. Yet it is the least discussed and understood since communication and 
interaction is largely within the working class and few intellectuals, foreign or 
Argentine have any substantial relationship with it. Indeed for too many years 
most intellectuals measured class consciousness among workers through 
questionnaires that evaluated verbal responses in terms of scales derived from 
abstract ideology. The conclusions usually found an ambiguity or low level of 
class consciousness — that was incomprehensible in terms of the actual levels 
of struggle. The high level of class consciousness of the Argentine working 
class was and is manifested through participation in collective class activity, 
and in the day to day inter-action in places and events which have a specific 
class character. 
In summary, then, despite the massive repression and physical destruc-
tion of thousands of local leaders, the Argentine working class has generated 
new leaders, organizers and direct action because the neighborhood, the fam-
ily and the rank and file in the factories have within themselves the capacity to 
reproduce themselves. Like Hydra, every time the regime cuts off one head, 
two take its place. 
NOTAS 
1. Juan Carlos Marín, Argentina 1973-1976: La Democracia, esa super-
stición y los hechos armados (cela, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 
Uruguay.) 
2. There are two qualifications that should be stated: mass workers' 
action is usually plant, or at most, industry based and focused on immediate 
economic actions. Without formal organization, it is hard to visualize how 
national-political struggles could successfully be organized. Within the 
limitations of locally anchored, economically motivated actions, however, 
exist the embryos of a new national working class organization. As we shall 
discuss later, the units and basis of class action, family, etc., shape the form of 
action. 
